impeding the transition and in beating a reconciliation and integration of tripoli fully into a post-gadhafi of arrangement? i recall when members of the transitional council were here in washington a few weeks ago and they said we do not want to fight our way through tripoli because we are worried about what that will mean when we need to reconcile. is that going to be a serious problem or do you feel they will be able to pacify tripoli without having done so much damage that reconciliation becomes difficult? the other question is hypothetical, but it is something we need to bear in mind. where do you think libya would be had there not then international intervention? what would have happened? as difficult as the current situation is, what would the

alternative had been like had there not been an international intervention. >> we always pushed for a possibility of a negotiated solution. if the united states would lead a negotiated deal with gadhafi said he could leave tripoli and to some success to deal with thednc and none of this bloodshed would happen. it is very bad and very tragic, but i think all libyans at the end will simply say okay, the dictator is gone, we are free, finally, after so many years and it has cost as many more deaths than necessary, but that is a war of liberation. i think it will lead -- some

will quest for vengeance, but i hope [unintelligible] to your second question, i think it will be -- it would have been crushed in the second or third day without the international community intervening. therefore, i think we are much better off and should be thankful for that intervention and we should -- everything considered, when a father comes and says i lost my son, you have a difficult time in telling, yes, but we did it for freedom. that causes problems and destruction and devastation, but in the end, i hope the libyans understand it was worth it and it was an act of courage and dignity and was worth it. >> thank you very much.

daniel, we're going to turn to you to discuss a little bit more the international role beyond the military intervention. how do you see the international role in libya following the fall of tripoli? if you can include in that not only the western world, the u.s. and european role, but the arab world, which has been very significant. there has been significant support from gulf states to this rebellion. >> we have to start on the international role inside libya with libyan requirements. that's very difficult to do right now because where are the authoritatively the invoices? let me imagine a bit what libyans will be feeling at the moment they really need,

recognizing full well i will defer and the lead to libyans if they say i am wrong. the immediate requirements are to block revenge killings, stabilize tripoli, get water and electricity flowing, dealing with humanitarian requirements and beginning a inclusive political protest. these are the things to be worrying about at the moment and i would be surprised of libyans were not worrying about them. but when you design the international effort, you need to be looking at longer-term goals as well. what are those longer-term goals? first and foremost is a safe and secure environment. the decision has essentially been made for the moment, at least, that there will be no international peacekeeping force. this is a decision whose wisdom we will know someday.

i would have preferred the europeans prepare to put paramilitary police into tripoli to stabilize the situation, but they would have to be landing right now and they are not. they have not organize such an effort and it is a mistake not to have organized it to be ready if it was needed. i would be the first to admit it would only deploy if the libyans requested it. why do i point that the europeans? i point that the europeans because they have violent trysts at stake in libya and the united states does not. -- they have vital interests at stake in libya and the united states does not. libya is connected by a liberal umbilical gas pipelines to europe. there are european oil and gas

supplies at stake. there is the risk of libyan migration if things really go to hell in a handbasket. there is the risk of libyan migration which should concern the europeans, which is not such a concern to the united states. so i do believe in all of what i am going to talk about now. i believe the europeans should play a leading role and the american role is to get the europeans to stand up to their proper role. we did this somewhat successfully with the military effort. i have not seen the same kind of success yet with the civilian effort. looking at the longer-term, libyans are going to want rule of law, at least in terms, i'm going to keep myself in a relatively benign scenario. this is a long-term project.

is not going to happen tomorrow. long-term training of the police and judiciary and corrections. yet to start quickly because it's going to take a long time. you cannot wait three or four years and begin a because then you will have three or four years of very bad experience. on the political front, the libyans have been great. they've prepared a constitutional charter and they may talk about it differently, each one, but it is great they have done this. it is a road map. it's a road map that includes a time schedule that is too fast, a constitution within six months, even less, and elections within a year. i will be surprised if they have to postpone that. but people have postponed elections before. they have done it in tunisia and egypt.

it's not a big issue if you are headed down the right path. i happen to believe they should do municipal alexian's first. i it's a big mistake to do national elections first, but there's only one case i can think of where municipal elections were done first, that was in kosovo, and at was a very stabilizing thing to do. why do i think that? all politics is local. or the least good politics is local. it is much harder to form a coalition based on the sect, secular is some verses islamists. you get a test of who is emerging, very direct relations between them and the local government. there's a lot of focus on getting libyans the money that they need. for the long term, the critical

issue is not the quantity of money. the transparency and accountability of the money. i've seen all progress, i have heard a lot of good intentions, but little progress in actually establishing a system by which they would be accountable publicly. this has to be a system inside libya to be accountable and transparent about how the money is being spent. i have never known a post- conflict situation that would have benefited from having less money sloshing around. the reason is less money means you have to decide what your real priorities are. more corruption, more problems, more focus on priorities. specifically once the oil and gas, that there be

accountability, and the citizens feel that it is coming to them. iraqis haveon't see any idea where their money goes to this point. i hope the libyans are able to do better. the and the it social needs are quite acute. this does not make headlines in great deal, but there are a large number of people have been displaced and need shelter, food, water. the transitional national council has been good about trends -- about cooperating with the ngos and providing basic needs and i expect them to do that in tripoli, but i expected to be much more difficult in tripoli, not least because of the security situation. in the long term, the social needs are larger than the basic

human needs. there will be a real need for a kind of social reconciliation, a political reconciliation, whenever you want to college. this was a regime with which a lot of people collaborated and a lot of as collaborators will collaborate with the new apparatus. i don't know the situation in which collaborators have not tried to turn quickly to collaborate again. it's the people who resisted the old regime that resist the new one as well and call it out for its misdeeds. it seems to me that libyans will need a process in due course of accountability for some type for the crimes of the previous regime. for that, they need a sought -- they need a strong civil society. civil society has blossomed and i hope it blossoms in tripoli.

it is really citizens that will prevent some of the bad scenarios. these are longer-term goals. i believe these should be set out clearly in a security council resolution. 1973 has been overtaken by events. we need a security council resolution that shows this to be a united, democratic libya under the rule of law that uses its natural resources for the benefit of all its people. that, to me, would be a kind of vindication, not a justification, but a kind of vindication of the nato effort. >> thank you. i wanted to ask you about a couple of questions or concerns i have about what the nature of the involvement of a post-

gadhafi libya would be like. one of them is whether we would see any kind of competition for influence between the west and the arab countries. some of the arab countries have played very significant roles in giving support to the rebels. there was a very significant islamic factor inside of libya. are we going to see international players supporting different actors trying to strengthen their hand in the evolving libya situation? are we going to see international assistance to libya being shaped or motivated by the desire to have a piece of the pie commercially in libya afterwards? are we going to see a scramble

-- libya, once it is through all of this, it is going to be wealthy country. >> yes, to all of the above, libya should count itself as lucky. there will be competition for influence in libya and competition for oil and gas. more power to the libyans. they can manage that competition to their advantage. as far as the arab issue is concerned, i don't really see that to tell you the truth. what i see is a kind of synergy. the west is having trouble moving money quickly to the national transitional council. the arabs were doing that quickly and i think that's fine from the libyan perspective. the western frozen money will come in -- will come in due course.

there was a good deal of unanimity between the arab world and the west. if that can be maintained, that would be a marvelous thing. so much as competition among the western powers is concerned, there will be. but that is good thing -- that is a good thing, basically, but it has to be managed and the libyans have to create eight level playing field. for their oil and gas resources. >> thank you, daniel. i'm going to turn now to peter. expanding this question of the international role and relations with libya and going forward, many of the african forces back

gadhafi, almost to the end. we have seen a number of them. i think 16 have recognize the transitional council, but i'm wondering how are libyans going to feel about africa as opposed to the arab world moving forward? gadhafi had become disillusioned and disappointed trying to reorient libya, not sure to what extent that was shared by the libyan population, but how do you think this is going to look in the new of libya, and i'm wondering if you can explain the role of south africa in the current situation and why south africa has continued to resist the transfer of assets to the transitional leadership? >> thank you. in order to understand libya's

relations with africa, a little history we have to take a look at. here and many aspects of his life, money -- moammar gadhafi was a little schizophrenic or had shown little of multiple personality. there is khaddafi the revolutionary who from the beginning of his regime spent a lot of libyan money financing liberation movements across africa. that has bearing on current events. then there is khaddafi the hegemon who tried to foment armed change of regime in african countries, financing guerrillas to attempt to overthrow and that brought this -- that brought destruction to large parts of africa. then when the sanctions for terrorism tried to hit their regime at home and they felt the arab companies were not given enough, he shifted to many of

whom who were his former victims for support. he became a pan-africanist, welcoming africans to move to libya, to a point where the sixth of the population was sub- saharan african and in fact, the african union was born out of a summit held in set and it was in . held ins sert i'm not sure if they're going to have to scrub their charter to treat -- scrub their charter to change that embarrassment. finally, they invested in in the structure throughout africa. all of these different khaddafi s, and which one was dealt with will reflect in how they have been dealing with libya to this countries that were least affected by libya have been the

most flexible in reaching out to the transitional national council. the ones that carry a lot of baggage, south africa from the revolutionary time carries the baggage from solidarity and the memory of gaddafi's financial support, that has affected their judgment to the fact were the south african deputy president called for a investigation of nato commanders for their role in assisting rebel forces during the civil conflict there. these differing interests are at play. from the african side, there is perceptions of what happened in libya. the refugees are returning. the violence that unfortunately occurred in some places, some africans were thought to be mercenaries and were more likely economic migrants to just border but brunt of resentment from people, that has affected some african perceptions. we are going to see in africa,

relations have a bit of a reset. the arab league has been much more forward in terms of lending diplomatic cover. recognizing the transitional council as a government where the african union has yet to come up with a consistent policy. the new government in libya will pick up more toward the arab world. they still need each other. from both sides. the africans cannot hope to stop the flow of arms from stockpiles that are beginning to see throughout markets in africa. in somalia, they have supported -- have reported weapons from libyan arsenals are showing up in somalia.

are showing up in bali. -- in mali. on the other side, libya needs the cooperation of african governments to rid shrieve assets the sovereign wealth funds -- to retrieve assets under the sovereign wealth funds, $15 billion invested in last year's from businesses to infrastructures that hopefully can be converted back into cash to use for development issues. >> thank you. i would note that in terms of the arab countries, the position they took toward libya was not at all uniform. initially, the question of the establishment of a no-fly zone

and the international intervention, a member of arab countries opposed that strongly, although they were eventually persuaded by saudi arabia to kind of step aside and the arab league did speak in favor of international intervention. that was an unusual step for the arab league and a lot of it goes back to the saudi and the against gadhafi. >> de african members of the security council, south africa, nigeria and gabon all voted for the resolutions. what was interesting is how they pivoted afterward. south africa does about its ambassador and nigeria its second medal position. this week, they recognize the transitional council. the president of bond -- president of called for the

ouster of gadhafi and recognize the transitional council. there's a bit of that threat the council. >> the libyan relations will need relations -- notably algeria, which was supportive of khaddafi. we will see what happens there. we're going to open up now to questions from the audience. we have microphones. speak your questions to the microphone and identify yourself. keep your questions brief and direct them to one of the panelists.

>> do you know what rebels, leaders, want to be leaders and how people can trust them? why do you think western nations have all the answers for the middle east problems, including libya? thank you. >> would you like to address that question? >> i have a gut feeling we have not seen the emergence of real leadership in libya yet. i do not think, but this is my personal opinion, that all of those kids and young people who fought in the streets, left their houses, who have seen

their brothers and friends killed will accept to be led by a political class that has been [unintelligible] people that have -- someone who has been prime minister some time as with gaddafi cannot come in and claim to be the new leader. someone has been ambassador cannot come back and become the ambassador. military commanders cannot think they would be leading the new battalions. there are new figures, a second group and the second line that will emerge after this. there are battalions of rebels who will claim the role and the bay will say i have more titles to be such and such.

people who've lived the revolt will emerge and we cannot expect people who have been abroad for 40 years can come back and roll it. they may need a support of expatriates' and another thing is [unintelligible] >> let me clarify something. i think there is a widespread assumption that the transitional council we now see or some form of that will actually leave libya in some kind of transitional time. are you saying other leaders are going to emerge? >> they have to enlarge, first of all.

once it will be larger, we will see other people coming in. these other people will put pressure and will open up places for other people. there will be a new wave of leadership. i do not believe that this is it. the new libya will be led by these people. i think this is an older, maybe experience, maybe a generation of people who have more or less than a good job in this moment. but i believe the legitimacy will come from people that will appear in the next month or two months. >> can i add a word? there have been a lot of journalistic commentaries that it is a hodgepodge. it is a hodgepodge and it has to become more of a hodgepodge.

a lot of different perspectives. when you are writing the rules, which is what a constitution is, distributes power among the institutions, that is what you need. a broad attempt as you can possibly have. i might be afraid of islamist influence to, but i definitely want them in and not outside. >> thank you. >> i have a question that you might pick on some of the pieces of this -- two pieces to this. one is the role of other arab states and what has played out in libya. it seems that this operation is quite remarkable and some of the training of the rebel forces and the arms supply. i wonder if you can talk about the varying roles of other arab countries in the conflict in

libya itself and what the implications, how that plays out. morocco and jordan also joined in formally becoming part of the native council that was part of conducting the operations. an interesting political decision on the part of morocco and jordan with saudi arabia playing a key role, yet staying back. if you could play that out a little bit. what is the impact of what is happening right now in libya on the arab spring? on the arab awakening more broadly? how does this play in syria and yemen, two countries in the midst of revolutions and revolt? also, what are the implications in tunisia and egypt, countries that have gone through the transition already? >> i will take a first cut at that, but if any of the other panelists want to we are seeing really confused,

chaotic picture in the arab world right now as arab states try to cope with the amount of change. is more than the system can bair. i mentioned i thought in some ways libya was a unique case. gaddafi made a unique mistake 80 or so years ago by trying to assassinate the king of south -- eight or so years ago by trying to assassinate the king of saudi arabia. they were eager to get rid of gaddafi. that has not been the saudi approach to other arab states in general. there were very unhappy to see president mubarak of egypt go.

even in syria, the saudis, i think only reluctantly came around to more or less giving up on al assad. it was an important step and a step that pave the way for more vigorous u.s. and european positions on what needs to happen in syria. we saw that most of the arab states did pull together in favor of change in libya. not all of them though. algeria stuck with gaddafi until close to the end. syria is very much preoccupied with its own problems and really cannot play this kind of all role. level not had a grudge against gaddafi and was eager to -- le

banon had a grudge against gaddafi and was eager to take that role. that does not reflect what the positions of arab states will be on changes going forward. libya was a unique case because it did not been made so many enemies over the years. syria -- i am certain that the opposition forces are in syria and yemen are going to be very much encouraged by what happened in libya. because, as i said, there is more than one way to overturn our regime. i think there was a pattern emerging that whereas it could happen peacefully and quickly in egypt and tunisia, then it can just not work. the libyans have shown that with

some help they were able to overcome the regime. that does not mean things are going to be easy going forward. libya does not look like a perfect scenario, but it does create another model. already we are seeing things devolving a bit into what will be an armed conflict. is not clear whether things will go that route in syria. but it is a possibility. is a possibility in deed that the divisions of the syrian army will begin fighting each other. there is this fourth division that is close to come up -- close to the president's brother and is expected to remain largely loyal to him. we could see the syrian conflict, which has been going on for a long time and slowly

spreading, becoming more divided, and i think that will raise questions about international military assistance of some kind. i am sure the international community has no interest in fomenting an armed conflict in syria, but if we saw poorly- armed divisions of the army fighting with the protesters against a well-equipped elite division at citing -- siding with us, i think that would raise questions. if libya is seen as presenting a successful case of international military intervention, that is going to raise a question, you know, about syria and whether there should be some form of military assistance. i want to be clear. not at all in the present scenario. only in the scenario where the

armed conflict develops inside syria. i think there are a lot of implications for the other rebellions in the arab world. and there are a number of countries, notably of urea -- algeria, where we have a model of leadership that is somewhat similar to the models being overturned successively in a lot of other arab countries, and there are going to be questions about whether there is going to be spillover. to other panelists want to comment? daniel i think you -- >> i think the scenario you painted for syria is our real possibility and would be a horrible mistake. a horrible mistake for the protesters, for the international community, for everybody concerned. why do i say that?

i do because the conditions for successful international military intervention simply do not exist with syria. there is not going to be enabling security council resolution. the russians will block it. there is no question in my mind about that at all. you have the potential in syria -- when the violence comes, people go for protection to their own community, their own family. you have the potential for ethnic strife and in syria that would truly be catastrophic. if we are smart, we will be assisting over and over again -- insisting over and over again that syria has to keep on the non-alignment track. and think there is serious potential for success. >> i agree with you that this is

a very unhappy scenario for syria. i did want to point out -- it might go that way. i am hearing from syria that is indeed a possibility. peter? >> this question also highlights the role that turkey has played, which has been rather extraordinary given the overall evolution of turkish foreign policy, the role it has placed in -- played in libya. as part of all broader role it has played in africa. i want to keep in mind this can be part of keeping syria going that direction. it is one thing to finance and assist our rebel movement across the mediterranean. it is another thing to have it on your doorstep. i think they will play a role in

helping encourage the syrian opposition to maintain discipline, and despite provocations, to avoid making this type of armed conflict. >> i agree turks will want to do that. they also have difficulty defining their own position. with libya, at a certain point, they were initially supportive of gaddafi. with syria, with saudi foreign minister make a trip there and make several -- with the syrian foreign minister -- we saw the foreign minister make a trip there and make several last- ditch efforts. other questions? >> i wonder if anyone would like to speculate about why the success stories in the air of

spring have all been in north africa? particularly there is not much evidence of a great deal of action between the three. any comments? >> well, i do not believe there has been contagion, and some of the longest standing -- i am not particularly puzzled why it has happened. >> it is a factor of the -- i am sorry. is a factor of the communication between one country. >> perhaps also, there is a factor -- i cannot help but think about bahrain when you raise this question. there was this uprising that was put down, i think temporarily.

i do not think we have seen the end of serious opposition in bahrain, but the countries in north africa are not next door to a large arab countries like saudi arabia that was willing to intervene in all kinds of ways, including militarily, to put down these uprisings. other questions? >> thank you. >> can you speak up a little bit? >> just a question concerning the external influence, which was addressed before. i would like, if possible, to expand on the possible role of russia and china, in particular

when it comes to economic interest. >> you know, i think we can expect the chinese to want some of the oil action. no doubt about it. this is of course to establish sooner rather than later a level playing field for oil and gas from libya. so far as the russians are concerned, i have not seen the same kind of concern about libya from the russians that you see about syria. syria is something they are very serious about. in a very real sense, libya is just a gas competitor to russia. in that sense, maybe a little on welcome return to the market, but that is part of the game. i think the russians will adjust

to that the bank for europe in particular, being able to diversify by taking libyan gas has been are really important factor in european gas. >> one of the things -- the cost of oil and gas and libya -- the real county, -- the real bounty is the money that comes from europe. that is why they are promising contracts right and left. the money would be spent here and there -- >> construction and so forth. >> construction. everything. that is the real issue.

it will be difficult. they might, to an extent, and all the rest is under negotiation. it is easy to promise contracts to everybody. >> and what about china? china had a large investment and it was a major issue. china took large losses in libya because of the uprising and they had a problem evacuating tens of thousands of chinese. >> they have to show efficiency. they took them out in have the time it took the americans. they got their ships from greece, and they shipped out

very quickly. but they will be back. the competition in construction. >> actually, that has proven to be remarkably flexible in this crisis, not only permitting the u.n. resolution to pass, but if china supports countries that buy oil from the rebels, $150 million worth, and they have already positioned themselves -- they made it very clear. name in a very high level statement they expect to go back and continue their contract, in fact expand upon that. it is unusual china would support our rebel movement, but here's a case where national economic interest for the state supply of oil and contracts with chinese businesses trump and ideological -- trump and ideological view of the libyan

conflict. >> ok. other questions from the audience? i want to raise one issue we have not really covered in this panel and it comments about that, which is the question of the return of the libyan assets. we are looking at over -- well over $100 billion in libyan assets, some of which are invested, but also liquid assets. we've seen the security council has approved the transfer of $1.5 billion from the united states to the transitional leadership. italy is pursuing been able to transfer money to the rebel leadership. what are your thoughts in terms of how this should be handled? how quickly money -- the money

that is liquid -- should be returned to libya? how might it be monitored and so forth? daniel, you already made the point that you think there is a danger of too much money too soon, but we also hear from -- including from the u.s. administration -- they are concerned about getting resources quickly to transitional leadership. i would like to hear any of the panelists to like to comment on this issue. >> you love got to have the money. but they should not have too much money. what they get should be transparently and accountable a -- accountably. you can rely on them to voluntarily do that. i do not think that is a wise. a security council resolution that lays out requirements on the right way to go, i do not

know -- >> are there models for that? >> there are lousy models for it for oil and food and things of that sort, but they really are lousy models. it is a system imposed on and on willing regime. i think you could get certainly the tnc to agree to some measures for accountability and transparency. my reading of them is that they are the kind of people who would be amenable. >> yes, i agree with him. i agree with daniel. i think it is important there is some way that is designed for this money that is given to the libyans with a clear about your -- voucher. technicians will decide where

the money goes, but i have an idea. but it should not simply be like that. also, because it puts strains on the tnc which are an amazing. most probably the people in charge right now to not belong. >> ok. >> i think the other thing to support is get the institutional capacity -- libya needs fast infrastructure. not just because of the destruction of war. because gaddafi has deprived his country for four decades. there is infrastructure that is lacking that has to be put in place. otherwise, all the money in the world will create hyperinflation without delivering value for the money. i think that is where i think the international community,

europeans -- united states and other countries can help with the technical capacity. >> i think the italians are behaving the best in this case. been promising $400 million since february, [unintelligible] is the money coming? it is not. they have sent a promise. it is and i know you. it is interesting. >> are there any other questions from the floor? one more. microphone please. thank you. >> if the panel can address the question of the libyan diaspora. what role will they play in the post-gaddafi libya? >> i think we are all very good.

[laughter] we want to see our country go back to democracy and freedom. the role of the diaspora would be relatively limited. i do not think the political leadership will come from the diaspora. there is one big problem. living abroad, we do not know what it means to live under 30 or 40 years of gaddafi. the language is different. the feelings are different. the emulsions. for these people -- the emotions. for these people, this is emotional stuff. the leadership is yet to come. it cannot be reject these people who have been a broad.

if i may have a minute for this. [unintelligible] i see the good in his point regarding this issue. having money for elections would be good because it would allow the beginning, the simple family clan. misrata will carry his plate. we have to find a way in the new assembly to reconcile the differences, the good that comes with the organization. libya needs to be reconstructed entirely.

they are doing everything they can to undermine any sense of mission, one single vision. they must be allowed to express what it means to be libyan. that is the unification. therefore, we have to make sure there is an effort toward reconciliation and unification is reconciled -- on the other hand with the strong emphasis on the municipalities. >> i think we will have to end their. thank you very much. thank you, kareem, daniel, and peter. we are going to take a break for

just a couple of minutes and we will of the second panel appeared promptly. thank you. >> an update on the situation in libya. the wife and two children of libyan leader gaddafi have crossed the border into out jerry. gaddafi's whereabouts are still unknown. more from the forum with the discussion looking at nato's role in libya. this is an hour and 10 minutes. >> welcome back. the atlantic council's international security program has always made trans-atlantic security matters of core focus of our activities here. we have a lot of opportunities

now, and that will continue over the next several weeks. the fall of gaddafi is not only a monumental moment in the arab awakening. is also a significant event tornado at a particular time in native's history and the trans- atlantic partnership more broadly. some have said that nato has not produce any tangible successes since 10 years ago and the libyan operation stands with some contrast to the success neo has encountered in afghanistan -- nato has encountered in afghanistan. the prime minister said the revolt would have been crushed quickly had it not been for western intervention. an important point to keep in mind. certainly there are those on the other side of the debate. there is an active debate on both sides of this issue on our

website. it was the secretary of defense to gave a speech that said behind the optimism lies some very blatant trends that cast a dark and cloud of the future of a military alliance to meet a different strategic threat to our security. here to debate these questions and others facing the transatlantic partnership in the aftermath of the doubt the's fall, we have a very distinguished and transatlantic panel -- aftermath of gaddafi's fall, with a very distinguished in transatlantic panel. without further ado, let me introduce each of them. damon wilson on the far right, not necessarily the far right of the views of the panel. he is the executive vice president of the council.

before joining the council, he served president george w. bush on the security council. his previous government positions include the chief of staff and executive secretary in baghdad, as well as from 2001 until 2004 deputy director of the private office of the nato secretary general. facing for my direction, the left of the panel, certainly not be left in the use -- the left in views, he, too, served under george w. bush. mr. miller served for 31 years under seven secretaries of state in a series of progressively senior positions. is also the world's most foremost -- he is also the

world's most foremost expert on nuclear weapons policy. before launching the foundation for the u.s. office, she certainly corporate sector as the vice-president of international relations for europe's largest media company. she founded the brussels office and served as director. she has served on the atlantic council's strategic advisory group. she also serves as vice chair of the global plan for b -- global philanthropy committee. i will turn right now to damon and asked a couple of questions. then we will open them up to the

floor. damon, a native's leading role the leading- nato's role in enforcing security council resolutions as part debate as to whether the recent success is our reason for optimism or exposes serious concerns about anita. secretary of defense robert gates warned that some allies would not to dissipate in the mission because they lacked the -- participate in any mission because they lack resources to do said. at the same time, others have argued this mission demonstrate nato felt enormous utility as a multinational organization capable of quickly and effectively organizing action. the key question i think, damon, is where you come down on this debate and where do you think the performance tells us about

the state of the world's most capable line? >> this is an issue we have been grappling with, thinking about nato and the future of the alliance. particularly in the united states. this is a success. this is a success for the alliance. it bodes well for the alliance. it does not mean there are not lessons learned to be drawn. i think that is a critical exercise it makes sense to be going through. that we begin with a caveat. i served in baghdad. i understand the complexity of what comes next. i do not think anyone in libya or the international community is outhe